A politically exposed person (PEP) is an individual who is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function — a head of state or government, a minister, a senior judge, a senior military or party official, a senior executive of a state-owned enterprise, or the head of an international organisation — together with the people closely connected to them. In Switzerland, Art. 2a of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) distinguishes foreign PEPs, domestic PEPs and PEPs in international organisations: relationships with foreign PEPs are always higher risk, while domestic and international-organisation PEPs become higher risk only when combined with at least one further risk criterion, and domestic PEPs cease to be PEPs 18 months after leaving office. In the EU, the AML Regulation (AMLR) makes no such distinction from 10 July 2027: every PEP triggers senior management approval, source of wealth and source of funds measures, and enhanced ongoing monitoring, and risk-mitigating measures continue for at least 12 months after the function ends.
1. The Swiss definition: three categories and their close associates
Art. 2a para. 1 AMLA defines three categories of politically exposed persons. Each covers people who are or have been entrusted with the function.
Foreign PEPs (let. a) are individuals entrusted with prominent public functions by a foreign country: heads of state or government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial, military or party officials at national level, and senior executives of state-owned corporations of national significance.
Domestic PEPs (let. b) are individuals entrusted with prominent public functions at national level in Switzerland in politics, government, the armed forces or the judiciary, and senior executives of state-owned corporations of national significance. The national-level qualifier matters: the statutory definition does not reach cantonal or communal office as such. Any scrutiny of a cantonal minister flows from your own risk criteria, not from PEP status.
PEPs in international organisations (let. c) are individuals entrusted with a prominent function by an intergovernmental organisation or an international sports federation — secretaries general, directors, deputy directors, board members or equivalent functions. Para. 5 defines the federations as the International Olympic Committee and the non-governmental organisations it recognises that regulate an official sport at global level — not a theoretical category in Geneva or Lausanne.
Family members and close associates (para. 2) are individuals recognisably close to any of the above for family, personal or business reasons. Swiss law does not enumerate them: the institution has to define in its internal directives what "recognisably close" means, and apply it consistently.
The 18-month rule — and what it does not cover
Art. 2a para. 4 AMLA provides that domestic PEPs are no longer regarded as politically exposed 18 months after relinquishing their position, with the general due diligence duties reserved.
Two points are easy to get wrong. The rule is limited to domestic PEPs: the Act sets no time limit for foreign PEPs or PEPs in international organisations, whose definitions keep covering persons who "have been" in office. And the end of PEP status is not the end of the analysis: a relationship with other higher-risk criteria stays higher risk on those grounds.
2. Automatic versus assessed higher risk in Switzerland
The Swiss regime is built on a two-tier logic, set out in Art. 6 AMLA and detailed in Art. 13 of the FINMA Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance (AMLO-FINMA; official versions in French, German and Italian), which applies to FINMA-supervised financial intermediaries.
Tier one — always higher risk. Under Art. 6 para. 3 AMLA and Art. 13 para. 3 AMLO-FINMA, relationships with foreign PEPs and their close associates are higher risk in every case: the classification follows from the status.
Tier two — higher risk in combination. Under Art. 6 para. 4 AMLA and Art. 13 para. 4 AMLO-FINMA, relationships with domestic PEPs, PEPs in intergovernmental organisations, PEPs in international sports federations and their close associates are higher risk when combined with one or more further risk criteria — for example the domicile or nationality of the parties, the nature of the activity, the size of the assets or the complexity of the structure, all listed in Art. 13 para. 2.
Art. 13 para. 5 closes a gap that practitioners sometimes miss: these classifications apply regardless of the role the PEP plays in the relationship — contracting party, controlling person, beneficial owner of the assets, or holder of a power of attorney. A foreign minister who merely holds a signing authority on a company account turns that relationship into a higher-risk relationship.
What enhanced due diligence means under AMLO-FINMA
Once a relationship is higher risk, Art. 15 AMLO-FINMA requires additional clarifications proportionate to the circumstances. The list includes the origin of the assets deposited (let. b), the origin of the wealth of the contracting party and the beneficial owner (let. e), their professional or business activity (let. f), and whether any of them is a PEP (let. g). Art. 16 requires the results to be checked for plausibility and documented, and Art. 17 requires the clarifications to start immediately. The practical method is set out in our source of wealth and source of funds guide.
Who approves
Art. 18 requires the agreement of a superior, a higher body or the executive management to accept any higher-risk relationship. For PEPs, Art. 19 goes further: the executive management at its highest level, or at least one of its members, decides on accepting relationships under Art. 13 para. 3 let. a and b (foreign PEPs and their close associates) and para. 4 let. a to c (domestic and intergovernmental-organisation PEPs and their close associates, where higher risk) — and decides every year whether to continue them. Intermediaries with very large wealth management activities and multi-layered structures may delegate this to business-unit management.
The annual continuation decision is often under-documented. It is a management decision, not a re-screening: the file should show who took it, when and why.
3. The EU definition under the AML Regulation
Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, the AMLR, applies from 10 July 2027 (Art. 90). Its PEP provisions sit in Art. 2(1), points (34) to (36), and Art. 42 to 46.
The functions. Art. 2(1)(34) lists, for a Member State: heads of state and government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers; members of parliament; members of the governing bodies of political parties with seats in national bodies, or in regional or local bodies for constituencies of at least 50,000 inhabitants; members of supreme, constitutional and other high-level courts, courts of auditors and central bank boards; ambassadors and high-ranking officers of the armed forces; members of the bodies of state-controlled enterprises; heads of regional and local authorities with at least 50,000 inhabitants; and other functions designated nationally. Equivalent functions at Union level, in international organisations and in third countries are covered too.
Family members (point 35) are enumerated: a spouse or partner, a child and the child's spouse or partner, a parent and — for heads of state or government and ministers, including deputy and assistant ministers, and equivalent functions — a sibling.
Persons known to be close associates (point 36) share beneficial ownership of an entity or arrangement with a PEP or have other close business relations with one, or solely own an entity known to have been set up for a PEP's de facto benefit.
The measures. Art. 20(1)(g) requires an obliged entity to determine whether the customer, the beneficial owner and, where relevant, the person on whose behalf a transaction is carried out, is a PEP, family member or close associate. Art. 42 then applies to all PEPs, without a foreign/domestic split: senior management approval to establish or continue the relationship, adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds, and enhanced ongoing monitoring. Art. 46 extends these measures to family members and close associates.
After office. Art. 45 requires the entity to take into account the continuing risk posed by a former PEP and to apply risk-mitigating measures until that risk no longer exists, but in any case for not less than 12 months after the function ended. Art. 22 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 already set that minimum; it now applies directly.
Lists and guidance still to come. Under Art. 43, each Member State must list the exact functions that qualify, and the Commission will publish a single EU list. Under Art. 42(2), AMLA must issue guidelines by 10 July 2027 on the criteria for identifying close associates and on the risk levels of PEP categories, including persons who have left office.
