KYC and AML compliance in Italy rests on Legislative Decree 231/2007, rewritten in 2017 and amended again in 2019, and on the Bank of Italy's implementing provisions on customer due diligence (adeguata verifica), internal organisation and record-keeping. The Banca d'Italia supervises banks and most financial intermediaries, alongside CONSOB and IVASS for their own sectors; suspicious transaction reports go to the UIF (Unità di Informazione Finanziaria per l'Italia) through the Infostat-UIF portal, before the transaction is carried out. Two things make 2026 unusual: the beneficial owner register is legally confirmed but still not operational, and the EU AML Regulation will apply directly from 10 July 2027.
For a Swiss bank or EAM, Italy is rarely a distant jurisdiction. It is the client base in Lugano, the subsidiary in Milan, or the custodian on the other side of a cross-border relationship. This guide sets out what the Italian regime requires in a client file and what to prepare before July 2027.
1. The legal framework: Decree 231/2007 as rewritten
Legislative Decree 231 of 21 November 2007 is the core text. Legislative Decree 90/2017 rewrote it almost entirely to transpose the fourth EU AML directive, and Legislative Decree 125/2019, in force since 10 November 2019, amended it again to transpose the fifth. In 2026, Legislative Decree 122/2026, in force since 23 July 2026, transposed the beneficial ownership register provisions of the sixth directive (Directive (EU) 2024/1640).
The Decree applies to Italian banks and financial intermediaries and, under Article 3(2)(t), to Italian branches of banks and financial intermediaries headquartered in another member state or in a third country. That second point is the one Swiss groups should keep in mind: a branch in Milan is a fully obliged entity, not an extension of the Swiss file.
The operating detail sits in secondary rules issued by the supervisors and the UIF.
| Instrument | Date | What it governs |
|---|---|---|
| Legislative Decree 231/2007 | 2007, rewritten 2017 and 2019 | Obliged entities, due diligence, beneficial ownership, reporting, record-keeping, sanctions |
| Bank of Italy provisions on customer due diligence | 30 July 2019, amended 13 June 2023 and 23 July 2025 | Ordinary, simplified and enhanced adeguata verifica, risk factors, remote identification |
| Bank of Italy provisions on organisation, procedures and internal controls | 26 March 2019, last amended 23 July 2025 | AML function, AML board member, annual risk self-assessment |
| Bank of Italy provisions on record-keeping | 24 March 2020 | Computerised retention systems and making data available to authorities |
| UIF instructions on detecting and reporting suspicious transactions | 18 December 2025, applicable from 1 July 2026 | Detection, assessment, filing and suspension of transactions |
2. Who supervises, and where reports go
Article 1 of the Decree designates the sector supervisory authorities as the Banca d'Italia, CONSOB and IVASS. In practice the Bank of Italy covers banks, investment firms, asset management companies, payment and e-money institutions and other financial intermediaries; IVASS covers life insurers and insurance intermediaries; CONSOB's AML remit concerns statutory auditors of public-interest entities. Article 7 gives these authorities the power to issue implementing rules, inspect, request documents and impose sanctions.
The UIF is Italy's financial intelligence unit, established at the Bank of Italy but distinct from its supervisory function. It receives suspicious transaction reports, analyses them and passes them on to the investigative bodies. The volume is substantial: the UIF's annual report for 2025 records 162,059 reports received, up 11.5% on 2024.
3. Adeguata verifica: what the Bank of Italy expects in a file
The Bank of Italy's 2019 due diligence provisions translate the Decree into an operating method. The structure is familiar: identify and verify the customer, any executor and the beneficial owner; obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and monitor the relationship on an ongoing basis, with intensity calibrated to risk.
Three features of the Italian text matter in practice.
The beneficial owner threshold is "more than 25%". Under Article 20(2) of the Decree, direct ownership is indicated by a holding above 25% of a company's capital; indirect ownership follows the same threshold through controlled companies, fiduciaries or nominees. Where ownership does not identify a natural person, the test moves to control (majority of votes, dominant influence, contractual ties) and, as a last resort, to the persons with powers of representation or management. For structures with fragmented shareholdings, that fallback is where the analysis actually happens.
Remote identification follows the EBA standard. The 2023 amendment removed the Bank of Italy's specific video-identification procedure, aligning remote onboarding with the EBA guidelines on remote customer onboarding. For digital channels, the reference is now the EBA framework rather than an Italian-specific protocol.
Enhanced due diligence is mandatory in defined cases. Article 24(5) requires enhanced measures always for relationships involving high-risk third countries, for cross-border correspondent relationships and for politically exposed persons. Article 25 then specifies the content: for PEPs, senior management approval, establishing the source of wealth and of funds, and enhanced ongoing monitoring; for high-risk third countries, additional information on the purpose of the relationship and the origin of funds, senior approval and more frequent controls. The method behind the source-of-wealth requirement is set out in our guide to source of wealth and source of funds verification.
4. PEPs and high-risk countries: two Italian specifics
The Italian PEP definition in Article 1(2)(dd) covers persons who hold or have ceased to hold within the last year important public offices, together with family members and close associates. It explicitly includes domestic offices and lists them precisely, down to mayors of municipalities with at least 15,000 inhabitants and companies controlled by such municipalities. For a Swiss institution with an Italian client base, that population threshold is the practical point: a local politician in a mid-sized Lombard or Piedmontese town is a PEP under Italian law, and screening lists built on national-level functions will miss them.
After the one-year mark, Article 24(6) still requires enhanced measures for former PEPs where the risk remains high. The decision to step down from enhanced due diligence is therefore a documented risk judgement, not an automatic date.
High-risk third countries are those identified by the European Commission (Article 1(2)(bb)). The list changes, which makes the enhanced due diligence trigger dynamic: a relationship that was standard yesterday can require Article 25 measures tomorrow without anything changing on the client's side.
5. Reporting to the UIF: before the transaction, via Infostat-UIF
Article 35 of the Decree is unusually demanding on timing. Obliged entities must send a suspicious transaction report to the UIF "before carrying out the transaction" and "without delay" when they know, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering or terrorist financing, or that funds derive from criminal activity, whatever the amount. Article 35(2) adds a duty to abstain: the transaction is not executed until the report is filed, except where execution cannot be deferred or deferral could hinder an investigation, in which case the UIF is informed immediately afterwards.
Reports are filed exclusively online through the Infostat-UIF portal. The UIF's new instructions of 18 December 2025, applicable since 1 July 2026, consolidate the process in three phases: identifying anomalies, assessing them, and reporting. They also cover the UIF's power to suspend a transaction for up to five working days, and they push hard against boilerplate: the description of the suspicion must be specific to the case, not a standard text.
The operational lesson is the one we drew for Germany's goAML regime: a reporting deadline is only as fast as the detection that feeds it. In Italy the constraint is tighter still, because the abstention duty means a slow assessment can delay a client's transaction.
